Capitalism And Democracy by Schwartz, Barry
Swarthmore College 
Works 
Psychology Faculty Works Psychology 
1-1-1988 
Capitalism And Democracy 
Barry Schwartz 
Swarthmore College, bschwar1@swarthmore.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-psychology 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Let us know how access to these works benefits you 
 
Recommended Citation 
Barry Schwartz. (1988). "Capitalism And Democracy". Tikkun. Volume 3, Issue 1. 66-72. 
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-psychology/779 
This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in 





The Capitalist Kevolution by Peter 
Berger. Basic Books, 1986, 262 pp.
Democracy and Capitalism by Samuel 
Bowles and Herbert Gintis. Basic 
Books, 1986, 244 pp.
I
W
hat is the relation between 
capitalism and democracy? 
As questions go, this one 
may seem like a nonstarter. Capitalism 
just is democracy, applied to the eco­
nomic sphere of life rather than the 
political. We hold this truth to be 
self-evident. Milton Friedman does. 
Ronald Reagan does. And so do all of 
Ronald Reagan’s political opponents 
who are even remotely electable to 
public office. We say, “It’s a free 
country” to justify our decisions about 
voting. We also say it to justify what we 
wear, what we eat, where we live, what 
work we do, what stocks we buy, who 
we buy from and sell to. Democracy, 
to most of us, means freedom of choice, 
and no institution better embodies our 
freedom of choice than the capitalist 
marketplace. When we contrast our 
society with those of Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union, it is the color­
lessness of their clothes, cars, and 
food, as much as their politics, that we 
find so appalling.
Like so many of the things we think 
we’re sure of, this apparent relation 
between capitalism and democracy is 
not what it seems. It is certainly logically 
possible to have one without the other. 
On the one hand, democratic socialism 
remains the utopian dream of many an 
intellectual. On the other, authoritarian 
or totalitarian capitalism has been the 
very real nightmare of millions of
Barry Schwartz is a professor of psy­
chology at Swarthmore College. His 
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human nature.
peasants living throughout the third 
world. So the relation between capital­
ism and democracy should not be 
taken for granted.
The Capitalist Kevolution by the 
sociologist Peter Berger and Democracy 
and Capitalism by economists Samuel 
Bowles and Herbert Gintis are both 
attempts to analyze the relation between 
capitalism and democracy. Although 
both books are concerned with the same 
issues and presumably are examining 
the same social, economic, and political 
phenomena, they come to radically 
different conclusions. Berger concludes 
that a capitalist economy is necessary 
for a political democracy, and that 
capitalism plays a crucial causal role in 
fostering and preserving democratic 
political institutions. Bowles and Gintis 
conclude that capitalism and democracy 
are in conflict, and that the price for 
preserving capitalism as we know it 
may well be extracted in the currency 
of democratic participation. These dif­
ferent conclusions are partly the result 
of powerful effects of distortions that 
occur when a dynamic historical process 
is frozen into a pristine but static 
image. A stopped watch tells the right 
time twice a day. If you check the 
watch at just the right moment, it 
seems to be working fine. Berger caught 
the old watch at just the right moment, 
then looked away. Bowles and Gintis 
kept looking when the moment passed.
II
Berger argues that ordinary, prosaic 
capitalism has been transformative 
and revolutionary. Even understood 
narrowly, as an economic system in 
which enterprising individuals or groups 
produce for a market with the purpose 
of making a profit, capitalism has played 
the decisive role in transforming modes 
of production, notions of private prop­
erty, and individual preferences and 
motives. It is to capitalism that the 
“rational calculation of self-interest” 
owes its current exalted status as the 
most central and most natural of all
human activities. Understood more 
broadly, as a culture within which an 
economic system is embedded, the 
significance of capitalism is still more 
profound: It has exerted its influence 
on our social, political, and cultural 
life, as well as on our economic life.
The Capitalist Revolution offers a 
set of fifty propositions about the rela­
tion between prosperity, equality, and 
liberty, along with a discussion of the 
empirical evidence that supports the 
propositions. The bottom line of the 
book is that most of what we find good 
about modern American society owes 
itself in no small measure to capitalism, 
while much of what we find unfortunate 
is not peculiar to capitalism and may 
even be to some extent ameliorated by 
it. This book, in a word, constitutes 
something like “two and a half cheers 
for capitalism.”
T
he first cheer for capitalism 
comes from an assessment of 
its contribution to material life. 
Berger’s proposition here is simple and,
I think, incontrovertible: “Industrial 
capitalism has generated the greatest 
productive power in human history. To 
date, no other socioeconomic system 
has been able to generate comparable 
productive power.” Although its begin­
nings extracted considerable human 
costs—probably material and certainly 
cultural—it has ended up generating 
the highest standard of living for the 
masses of people in human history. 
And it is capitalism itself, not the 
peculiar agglomeration of religious and 
cultural elements that characterized 
Western Europe when capitalism began, 
that is responsible for this great mate­
rial success. Production for profitable 
market exchange provides the best 
possible conditions for ongoing tech­
nological development, continued in­
creases in efficiency, and sustained 
growth in productivity. This proposition 
is confirmed by the development of 
industrial capitalism in East Asia over 
the last century. Although they had 
none of the cultural baggage of the
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West, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South 
Korea, and Singapore have essentially 
duplicated, at least materially, the 
Western capitalist experience. So effi­
ciency, productivity, and affluence make 
for one ringing cheer for capitalism.
The second cheer for capitalism 
comes from Berger s assessment of the 
relation between capitalism and democ­
racy. He defines democracy as “ a politi­
cal system in which governments are 
constituted by majority votes in regular 
and uncoerced elections,” and he argues 
that people can’t have a democracy 
without capitalism, that is, that capital­
ism is necessary for democracy. The 
argument is partly one of brute empiri­
cism; if you count up socialist and 
capitalist democracies in the ftiodern 
world, it turns out that capitalism is 
pitching a shutout (leaving aside a few 
possible ambiguous cases). But it isn’t 
just a matter of counting. Berger also 
offers suggestions about why this rela­
tion between capitalism and democracy 
might hold.
Democracy represents an attempt to 
limit state power, by making the state 
and its bureaucracy dependent upon 
and accountable to the people. The 
more aspects of life the state controls, 
the more difficult it becomes to limit 
state power. Capitalism and the market 
provide an institutional roadblock to 
the expansion of state power. No matter 
how regulated the economy may be, as 
long as it is not owned by the state, what 
the state can do is limited. The truth 
of this claim can be seen by the contrast 
with socialism, in which empirically at 
least the “command economy” carries 
along with it an immense expansion of 
state power and control. While it is 
true that developed capitalism has seen 
the corporation grow to such extra­
ordinary size that its span of control 
and layers of bureaucracy are massive, 
there are many such corporations, not 
one, and their interests are not perfectly 
aligned, either with each other or with 
the state. As a result, they keep the 
power of the state within bounds and 
allow “the people” to govern.
The fundamental idea behind this 
argument is of great importance. It is 
bracing to think of democracy as gov­
ernment “of the people, by the people, 
and for the people.” But the sad fact is 
that “the people” as individuals are 
powerless before the institutional struc­
ture of the state. Nowadays, even Don 
Quixote might get discouraged. Much
more effective is political action that is 
mediated by nongovernmental institu­
tions that have and sustain a life of 
their own. Families, tribes, villages, 
labor unions, chambers of commerce, 
religious groups, universities, and the 
like provide the needed mediating struc­
tures or mediating institutions between 
individuals and the state. Berger has 
done seminal work on the character 
and importance of mediating institu­
tions in the past (to wit. To Empower 
People: The Role of Mediating Structures 
in Public Policy with Richard Neuhaus, 
1977). His suggestion in the present 
book is that the market and the firms 
that participate in it are essential 
mediating institutions. Indeed, in the 
modern world, the market and the 
firm may be the most powerful mediat­
ing institutions we have. Hence Berger’s 
claim that capitalism is necessary for 
democracy, his second rousing cheer.
The final cheer for capitalism comes 
from an assessment of its effect on 
social and cultural life and institutions. 
This cheer is not unequivocal. Berger’s 
discussion focuses on social mobility 
and stratification on the one hand and 
individualism on the other. The record 
on social mobility is a good one for 
capitalism. Berger tells us that no known 
society exists or has existed that has 
not ranked its members in some way. 
Furthermore, rank has always conferred 
privilege or power. The critical question 
one might ask about systems for rank­
ing people concerns how rigid and 
all-encompassing the rankings are. 
According to Berger, under capitalism 
there has been an unprecedented po­
tential for social mobility—for move­
ment between ranks. Berger carefully 
points out that increased social mobility 
is characteristic of all forms of industri­
alization, not just capitalism. Never­
theless, capitalism is first among equals, 
“most likely to maintain openness in 
the stratification system of a society.”
This brings us to the down side of 
capitalism and culture, its relation to 
individualism, or what Berger calls 
“individual autonomy.” The United 
States is the pinnacle of individualist 
culture. Our individual autonomy, pro­
tected by a host of legal and political 
institutions, extends to almost all do­
mains of life. As Berger points out, 
whether individualism is a good thing 
is itself controversial. “Today the pro­
ponents of capitalism almost always 
refer to its alleged linkage with indi­
vidual liberty ... precisely in the sense 
of allowing and fostering the free un­
folding of the individual person. On 
the other side, critics of capitalism 
routinely blame it for the alleged ex­
cesses of ‘rampant individualism,’ for 
selfishness and personal greed, and for 
the disintegration of community.” And 
the critics are by no means all wild­
eyed leftists. Concern about the dis­
integration of community and social 
responsibility is at least as much a cry 
of the right, including the religious 
right, as it is of the left. So is individual­
ism a triumph or a disaster?
Berger’s answer is that individualism 
is both. It is a triumph because it is 
liberating. It frees the individual from 
having to walk the narrow, rutted path 
of his or her ancestors. It opens the 
way for innovation—social, cultural, 
and technological. It is destructive of 
tradition, but not mindlessly so. It 
destroys the old by creating something 
new to replace it. But individualism 
can go too far. There is no guarantee 
that the mediating structures and in­
stitutions that are so important to the 
preservation of democracy will continue 
to sustain themselves if no one takes 
the time and trouble to look after 
them. And individualism seems to make 
people less and less inclined to take 
the time and trouble. In part, the 
problem is that each of us decides to 
let someone else do the communal 
work while we continue to derive the 
personal benefits. But the problem is 
also that as individuals exercise their 
freedom in ever more diverse ways, 
they find themselves less and less able 
to fit into any existing communal group.
I
t is possible to pin some of the 
responsibility for individualism on 
modernity in general rather than 
on capitalism in particular, and Berger 
tries to do this. Yet capitalism seems to 
bear a special, intimate relation to 
individualism. As pointed out by soci­
ologist Georg Simmel, the money 
economy “frees the individual from 
the bondage of concrete allegiances.” 
Capitalism allows individuals to pur­
chase not just commodities, but status, 
power, and social position. “Money, 
with its great power of abstraction, 
makes it possible to convert all socially 
relevant phenomena ... into units of 
specific monetary worth.” There can 
be no more fluid ticket of admission to 
one or another social group than money.
Review 67
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so that the more money allows one to 
buy, the more one can be a free agent, 
with only short-term allegiance, at best, 
to particular social institutions. If all 
assets—even social ones—are convert­
ible into cash, people can flit from 
group to group without leaving anything 
of value behind.
What may be a decisive test of the 
relation between capitalism and corro­
sive individualism is now slowly un­
folding. It concerns the phenomenon 
of East Asian capitalism, especially in 
Japan. Japan has less of the West’s 
general individualist ideological bag­
gage, and even its capitalism has been 
remarkably collectivist. Can it avoid 
individualism? Berger thinks not. “The 
societies of East Asia have succeeded 
for a considerable time in modernizing 
under capitalist conditions without 
undergoing individuation along Western 
lines. [However,] the values of indi­
vidual autonomy are undermining East 
Asian communalism and are likely to 
continue doing so.”
By Berger’s account, we now face a 
capitalism-nourished individualism that 
threatens to destroy our sense of com­
munity. Relations between people are 
becoming increasingly contractual, and 
the contract “spells our rights and 
obligations in a precise and exclusive 
manner. This stands out in sharp dis­
tinction from the imprecise, diffuse 
networks of rights and obligations that 
characterize most if not all pre-modern 
societies. The capitalist market, of 
course, could not exist without a mature 
development of contract law. But there 
is a carry-over from the market to all 
other human relations.” This contrac- 
tualism, breeding as it does a cold, 
calculating, purely instrumental view 
of other people, does not bode well for 
the family, the church, local clubs and 
groups, and other mediating institutions 
that give some warmth to life. And as 
we have seen, threats to these mediating 
institutions are also threats to democ­
racy. Indeed, in the long run, they are 
even threats to capitalism. Berger him­
self puts it this way; “Progressive 
anarchy, with each individual out ‘on 
the make’ by and for himself, under­
mines capitalism, because it deprives it 
of the fabric of trust and value without 
which it cannot function effectively.” 
Berger is exactly right here, but he 
underestimates how much the negative 
effect of capitalism is slowly but inex­
orably undermining the positive ones.
Somehow, he fails to see that capitalism 
is now a stopped watch, and that two 
and a half cheers are just not enough.
The failure of Berger’s vision may 
derive from his seriously misplaced 
confidence in the ability of the firm 
and the market to replace the mediating 
institutions which capitalist individual­
ism destroys. To serve the end of 
promoting democratic participation, 
not just any institution will do. This 
point is clearly made by Harry Boyte 
and Sara Evans in their discussion of 
the importance of voluntary associa­
tions as sources of democratic change 
(see their articles in Tikkun, Vol. I, 
No. 1, and Vol. II, No. 3, and the book 
Free Spaces, Harper & Row, 1986). The 
critical features of such institutions 
are their rootedness in the community, 
their independent, voluntary nature, 
and “their public or quasi-public char­
acter as participatory environments 
which nurture values associated with 
citizenship and a broader vision of the 
common good.” It doesn’t take a cynic 
to understand that the firm and the 
market are the last places to look for a 
vision of and concern for the common 
good. Individuals in the market don’t 
care a whit for the common good, nor 
are they “supposed” to. The whole point 
of the market is that it allegedly makes 
concern for the common good unneces­
sary. As economist Charles Schultze 
put it, “market-like arrangements reduce 
the need for compassion, patriotism, 
brotherly love, and cultural solidarity.” 
And leaving aside so noble an idea as 
the common good, nowadays, individ­
uals don’t even care about the welfare 
of the firm that employs them. They 
will, and do, sell the long-term interests 
of their company down the river in 
exchange for short-term benefits to 
themselves. How does this behavior 
promote true democratic participation?
In voluntary associations of the sort 
that really do promote democracy, the 
whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts. As Boyte and Evans see it, “The 
strength of such groups, from a demo­
cratic perspective, is that they have an 
independent existence and reality dif­
ferent from personal relations on the 
one hand, or large and impersonal 
relations on the other. The stuff of 
authentic ‘politics’ involves conflict,
argument and debate__ Indeed, it is
often through a clash of opinion in the 
context of certain shared and over­
arching aims, that a generalized and
authentically democratic appreciation 
of the common good emerges.” The 
Black churches of the American South 
and the Catholic based communities 
throughout Latin America have served 
perfectly the role of mediating institu­
tions by providing spaces for open 
discourse and by being responsive to 
local concerns. In contrast, the official 
Catholic church hierarchy, closed to 
debate except among the elite, has not 
played this role and has become so 
large and impersonal that it has lost 
touch with the concerns of its members.
By regarding the market and the 
firm as potential mediating institutions, 
Berger implicitly takes the view that 
mediating institutions in general are 
really nothing but interest groups, 
single-issue lobbies out for themselves 
without concern for the common good. 
In other words, he makes the narrow, 
self-interested, profit-seeking character 
of the firm the model for all social 
institutions, in practice if not in theory. 
While it is true that interest groups 
restrain the power of government, they 
do so by introducing conflict and com­
petition for pieces of the economic pie 
controlled by government. Not every 
such interest group can get everything 
it wants, but the lesson of the market is 
that no self-respecting interest group 
should ever stop angling for all it can 
get. Self-restraint is a game for suckers. 
The result is that government is pulled 
simultaneously in dozens of incompat­
ible directions; interest-group politics 
substitutes government ineffectuality 
for government autocracy. With medi­
ating institutions like these, we are all 
Robinson Crusoes.
Ill
Economists Samuel Bowles and 
Herbert Gintis see what Peter Berger 
does not. Their book Democracy and 
Capitalism is a persuasive argument 
that the actual relation between democ­
racy and capitalism is one of constant 
tension and conflict rather than com­
patibility and support. This conflict is 
opaque to most observers because sev­
eral centuries of social and political 
philosophy have seduced us into view­
ing the world through lenses that make 
the obvious almost impossible to see. 
And yet, the conflict grows so acute 
that the future may require us to choose 
between democracy and capitalism.
68 Tikkun, Vol. 3, No. 1
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A
mericans have grown up steeped 
in a liberal individualism that 
distinguishes between the pub­
lic and tbe private spheres of life. The 
focus of the public sphere is the state, 
and the matters of political power, right, 
and responsibility that go with it. Essen­
tially, everything else is private. Im­
portantly, within the liberal tradition, 
democratic principles only apply in do­
mains that are public. That is, rational 
adults elect state leaders. In other do­
mains of life, like the family, the church, 
or the workplace—domains that are 
private—principles of democracy are 
irrelevant. Thus, there is no conflict 
between capitalism and democracy be­
cause their principles apply in different 
and nonoverlapping domains. In'effect, 
conflicts between capitalism and dem­
ocracy are eliminated by definition.
If you don’t rule out conflicts by 
definition, you get them. Consider 
property. Private property is the sine 
qua non of capitalism. People have the 
right, within broad limits, to do what 
they want with their property. So why 
is it that I am not allowed to exclude 
you from my restaurant because you’re 
Black, or a woman? Why can’t I refuse 
to hire you, or refuse to pay you as 
much as I pay others doing similar 
work, because of your race, sex, or 
religion? The answer is that much, if 
not all, private property has a public 
aspect. Society decides to what extent 
principles of democracy should apply 
to the domain of private property. 
Much of the civil rights movement in 
this country, as well as the women’s 
movement, can be seen in fact as a 
struggle to extend principles of democ­
racy from the domain of the state to 
the domain of private property.
Instead of liberalism’s artificial di­
chotomy of public and private, Bowles 
and Gintis offer a vision of social life 
as divided into spheres—the economic, 
the political, the cultural. The novelty 
is that each sphere of life has its own 
economic, political, and cultural as­
pects. Seen in this light, all spheres of 
life become contested terrain, battles 
between principles of democracy and 
principles of ownership. While this has 
always existed, due to the simultaneous 
expansion both of rights and of markets, 
the conflict between democracy and 
ownership has grown especially acute 
during the last few decades. The lan­
guage of liberal democracy has increas­
ingly invaded the firm, the school, and
even the family, slowly changing the 
norms of appropriate conduct in these 
domains. At the same time, “the capi­
talist firm’s ongoing search for profits 
progressively encroaches upon all 
spheres of social activity, leaving few 
realms of life untouched by the impera­
tives of accumulation and the market.” 
That liberalism has effectively walled 
off considerations of democratic rights 
from considerations of ownership and 
that the wall is now crumbling is the 
heart of the Bowles and Gintis book. 
They discuss at length how economists 
and social theorists from both the left 
and the right have lacked this insight 
and, as a result, have misdiagnosed the 
problems society faces and have mispre- 
scribed solutions. Neoclassical econ­
omists have traditionally viewed eco­
nomics as divorced from politics and 
questions of power. The myth of the 
market is that it is anonymous, imper­
sonal, and apolitical. You sell to anyone 
for the right price and you buy from 
anyone for the right price. People who 
misuse the market by excluding seg­
ments of the population from the 
workforce or the customer pool or by 
withholding sound investments for 
nonbusiness reasons will be driven out 
of business by competitors who will 
hire anyone qualified, sell to anyone 
who can pay, and invest in anything 
that seems profitable. The only “power” 
that is displayed in the market is the 
power of economic rationality: efficient 
production, comparative advantage, and 
inventive opportunism. The language 
of rights and control has no place.
So goes the traditional view of the 
market economy. It is false, and not 
just because actual markets are only 
approximations of the perfectly com­
petitive abstractions that economists 
talk about. Bowles and Gintis show 
that this view of the market is false for 
deep reasons that “perfect competition” 
won’t change. The heart of the problem 
is that while economists view the labor- 
wage exchange between worker and 
boss as they would any other commodity 
exchange, it is not. Labor cannot be 
alienated from the laborer. You don’t 
hire work, you hire workers. And to 
extract work from the worker, the boss 
must be able to exert control. When 
you buy a stereo, you know what you’re 
getting. When you “buy” a worker, 
what you get is very much up in the air.
What this means is that in addition 
to the cost of the wage itself, the boss
must absorb the cost of enforcing the 
wage bargain. This may mean paying 
overseers or supervisors. It may mean 
offering incentives for productivity. It 
may mean being able to threaten serious 
sanctions for slacking off. What is 
clear, however, is that the more power 
the boss has over the worker, the more 
s/he will be able to get his or her 
money’s worth on the job.
The costs of enforcing the wage 
bargain are substantial. The way that 
cost can be reduced is found in how 
the state enforces its laws. The costs of 
enforcement go down as the perceived 
legitimacy of the state and its laws goes 
up. In a participatory democracy, most 
citizens perceive themselves as having 
some responsibility for the rules that 
are promulgated and some stake in the 
success of the government. After all, 
the people who pass and enforce the 
laws are ultimately responsible to the 
citizens who elect them and pay their 
salaries. As a result, most laws are 
largely self-enforcing. In an autocratic 
state, the costs of enforcement are 
enormous. Rules have no perceived 
legitimacy, and anyone will do whatever 
s/he thinks s/he can get away with.
T
he lesson is clear. The capitalist 
can reduce enforcement costs 
by making his or her operation 
less autocratic and more participatory. 
S/he can give workers a voice in 
decision-making, make their work in­
teresting and fulfilling so that they can 
identify pridefully with the company, 
and perhaps even give them a financial 
stake in the operation. And the evidence 
is that democratization of the work­
place does increase efficiency as well 
as worker satisfaction. The lower en­
forcement costs and higher efficiency 
that come with democratized and mean­
ingful work would lead an economist 
to expect that, over time, democratized 
firms would drive autocratic ones out 
of existence. If one company makes 
things cheaper and better than its 
competitors, the competition either 
changes or goes under.
This hasn’t happened. Indeed, there 
is little evidence that worker participa­
tion projects are anything but a mild 
perturbation on an otherwise smooth 
sea of autocracy. Why aren’t worker- 
controlled firms taking over the market? 
Bowles and Gintis discuss several rea­
sons why workplace democratization 
is not yet having the impact that.
Review 69
 ri  i   i -
lic and the private s heres of life. The 
f   t t , 
a  t  t
 it. s -
ti ll , . I -
rt tl , 
de cr ti  i -
ains t t r  
a lts l t  -
ains f lif , li  
r t  lace-do   
te-princi  r  are 
irrel t.  
et  -
ca s  t i   
a  · eff , 
fli t  -
i . 
If  '
efi iti , .  
r t i  
qua  f i
ri t, it i  
t e  t  
is it t t   
  'r  
la , r  '  
 t  a  you as 
    
 , se , or 
reli i   
t ll,  
  t t 
princi l   
i t  r erty. 
t i  
 's 
t   
str -
  t t  t  
 i t  r erty. 
I st  ' -
ch t  f 
and i tis ff   
 eres-t i , 
the liti l, 
i   it   
ec i , -
pects.  i  
life e  
bet  ri
pri ci l   . 
l   
e i  , 
the c fli t 
r i   
duri  t  l -
  i r as-
ingly i a ~  t    
even t  f il , 
n r s f 
. "  i-
talist fir '  
progressi el  
s r   
 i r -
ti   ." 
hat li r li  
off c i
fr  i
t at t  l  
heart f t  
i t  
and s ci l t
a  t  i
a , s  
i r -
s ri  -
i t  -
no ics s i
questi s f 
, i er-
  
for t e ri t 
any e f r t  
i  -
e ts   
r f r   
ith l i  
 t 
f i   
 t  e 
  ,  
t  " r" 
t at is i  
r f  
prod cti , 
i ti .  
 . 
o  t ~ 
r t  t 
just e  
 -
 ists 
tal  t.  
that t is i  
" t tition" 
't  
is t t il  
a e 
ss s t   
.   
li t 't 
ir  ,  
tr    
st   
 t 'r  
etti . " " , 
t  i . 
i  
t  t  t  
st  
.  i  
. t  ean 
ff i ti it . It 
 ri s 
t is 
 r  er 
t   r  
s/he ill  
'  
  
bar i  r  
c st   
the state f r  .  
e f r t 
l it   
r , st 
citiz s 
so  r
are pr l t  
success f t  
the pe l   
la s are lti t
citize s  l
s l ri .  
l ti  
t re 
enor s. l
le iti , 
s/  t i   
T  l  t c sts  r ti  
less autocratic and more participatory. 
/ i  i  
ecisi - -
t r ti   
 , 
and er  
sta  i  t  
is that -
place  i  
 l r -
f r  
t t -
i i t 
t  t t  
 t r ti  nes out 
f i t .
t i   it  
c tit , 
r. 
_his '  
i  li ti i -
ti  r j  
ert r ti  
sea f t '
c tr ll    
l   -
ti ti  
is n t t , 
EVIEW  
on grounds of economic efficiency, it 
should. The one I focus on here can be 
traced to the difference between hiring 
work and hiring workers. Suppose you 
are about to set up a plant and establish 
jobs that are engaging, require sub­
stantial training and skill, and pay 
well. You hire workers and spend several 
months, and many thousands of dollars, 
training them. In effect, you use your 
capital to invest in education and train­
ing instead of in the plant and high- 
tech equipment. Who now owns that 
investment? Not you. If you fire the 
workers that you trained, or if they 
quit, they take the investment with 
them. The more time you spend training 
people, the greater your stake in keeping 
them and the greater their leverage in 
situations of conflict. While your firm 
may become more productive and effi­
cient than the competition, you will 
not be in a position to insure that you, 
and not your workers, will enjoy the 
proceeds of that increased productivity. 
Furthermore, it is always possible that 
your skilled workers will blackmail you 
into paying them wages that are so high 
that any potential efficiency advantage 
is lost. Because you don’t own workers 
and thus can’t completely control their 
behavior, it seems prudent to invest in 
machines and keep jobs as menial as 
possible.
The “deskilling” phenomenon occur­
ring within the American labor force 
has become an issue of widespread con­
cern as America becomes increasingly 
a third-world-style economic nation, 
exporting raw materials and importing 
manufactured goods. It’s a phenomenon 
that no one wants but about which 
nothing can be done as long as the 
liberal split is maintained between the 
public and the private, with matters of 
property firmly located in the private 
domain. Understandably, Bowles and 
Gintis would bring at least some aspects 
of property into the public domain. 
They argue that any exercise of power 
that has significant social consequences 
should be seen as public, whether that 
power is exercised by the state, by the 
economy, or even by the church or the 
household. And if it is seen as public, 
then principles of democratic decision 
making apply. There is no question that 
economic developments have significant 
social consequences. What follows from 
this is that the behavior of private 
firms should be the product of public 
decision making.
IV
In the portrait of human nature 
painted by liberalism, people are 
“choosers,” acting in private (the 
market, the bedroom) or in public (the 
voting booth) to satisfy their prefer­
ences. What this portrait leaves out, 
Bowles and Gintis tell us, is any ac­
count of where preferences originate. 
Liberalism (and neoclassical economics) 
treats preferences as “exogenous,” out­
side the system, given. There is no 
accounting for tastes; liberalism merely 
supplies the rules for the exercise of 
free choice in satisfying whatever those 
tastes are. People are what they are, 
human nature is what it is, and liberal­
ism simply sees to it that people are as 
free as possible to exercise their natures.
B
owles and Gintis argue that 
the notion of exogenous prefer­
ences just won’t do. “Liberalism 
claims that the marketplace and the 
ballot box allow people to get what 
they want. But liberalism is silent on 
how people might get to be what they 
want to be, and how they might get to 
want what they want to want.” Prefer­
ences come from somewhere; tastes 
are formed by something. People are 
what they are in part as a result of the 
conditions they encounter in their lives. 
The critical insight here is that econ­
omies do not just make things; they 
also make people. The cauldron of 
liberalism and capitalism permits not 
just the exercise but the formation of 
the will.
The reason this is so important is 
that the character of both an economy 
and a state will depend in part upon 
the character of its participants. An 
economy that encourages the pursuit 
of self-interest as a matter of right or 
even of obligation is prevented from 
becoming a bazaar of deceitful, back- 
stabbing monsters only by the moral 
commitments that people bring with 
them to the marketplace. A democracy 
that offers individuals little opportunity 
for genuine participation is prevented 
from becoming a collection of automa­
tons marching periodically to the polls 
to record their affection for “ communi­
cators” only by the commitment people 
have to behaving as responsible citizens. 
If we could count on moral commitment 
and political responsibility, democracy 
and capitalism might coexist in the 
way that Berger suggests. But the very
features of the human character on 
which liberal democracy depends can­
not be taken for granted. On the 
contrary, the political and economic 
system extolled by Berger actively 
erodes that character.
In the modern, liberal, capitalist 
state, the expression of will is restricted 
to the choice of a preestablished slate 
of candidates, either in the market or 
in the voting booth. The alternative to 
choosing from a given selection of 
candidates or of goods is taking an 
active part in the shaping of that 
selection. Such participatory activity is 
what Albert Hirschman calls “voice” 
(see his Hxit, Voice and Loyalty). Giving 
voice in a large and complex society 
typically requires some form of group 
membership, some form of gemein- 
schaft, the “mediating institutions” 
previously mentioned, which market 
capitalism destroys. It is a great irony 
that those for whom mediating institu­
ions like the family, the church, and 
the small-town community are most 
important are capitalism’s most ardent 
defenders.
The mistake made by those who, 
like Berger, defend capitalism in part 
by crediting it with extending social 
interaction across previously impreg­
nable barriers, increasing social mobil­
ity, and destroying autocratic, parochial 
domination, is their failure to appreciate 
that the effects of their capitalism are 
dynamic. Capitalism grinds away at 
social structures that are rigid, unjust, 
and oppressive, but when it gets to 
social structures that are flexible, fair, 
and liberating, it doesn’t stop grinding, 
it just keeps on going and presumably 
will continue until social structures 
are simply gone. By photographing 
capitalism at one moment in its history, 
and staring at the photograph, one 
misses the important point that capital­
ism is not a still life, it’s a movie.
The reason that the social decay we 
are experiencing has not been more 
noticeable to us is that markets reduce 
the costs to individuals of not partici­
pating actively in politics. As long as 
we have the cash, we can buy the ends 
we desire as individuals instead of cam­
paigning, organizing, and arguing for 
them as groups. We can spend money 
on private schools and safe neighbor­
hoods. It is this very lack of the need 
for group organization and coordina­
tion that champions of the market 
applaud. And as public commitment
70 Tikkun, Vol. 3, No. 1
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and cultural solidarity grow weaker, 
market solutions to social problems 
look more sensible. Eventually, politics 
itself enters the market, with politicians 
“selling” programs for votes or cam­
paign contributions. This leads to a 
dramatic diminution of the democratic 
voice. Once we start buying votes, 
politicians become property, and the 
norms of ownership wrest control of 
the state from the norms of democratic 
participation.
The consequence of equating norms 
of government activity with norms of 
market activity is that in the market, 
action is indicated only when the out­
come of a cost-benefit calculation is 
positive. All action is instrumental; it 
is done to get something. If we carry 
this instrumental view of action into 
politics, there is virtually never a good 
reason to act. There is really nothing 
you can do as an individual to influence 
political life except for buying poli­
ticians. And what you can do as a 
member of a group can be done just 
as effectively by the group without 
you. As a result, the rational, economic 
stance to political activity is to be a 
“free-rider.” It doesn’t even make much 
sense to vote, let alone to organize, 
campaign, letter-write, or picket. Why, 
then, does political activity still occur? 
The answer is that people do not yet 
regard their activity as merely instru­
mental. Group membership and parti­
cipation are also expressive; they are 
part of what defines people. People 
vote because of their self-images as 
citizens. People picket because it is 
consistent with their moral vision of 
themselves. At the heart of democratic 
participation is the idea that action is 
not just a means to an end.
But this idea is not engraved on the 
human character. As the ethos of the 
market and economic rationality govern 
more and more of our lives, the likeli­
hood of participation will diminish, 
as indeed it already has. Once this 
happens, the various local groups— 
mediating institutions—that occupy the 
vast space between the individual and 
the state start to disintegrate. Thomas 
Jefferson thought that a healthy democ­
racy required these “small republics,” 
that they would be “the main strength of 
the great one.” Bowles and Gintis add, 
“In the absence of vital communities 
standing between the individual and 
the state, liberalism’s cherished political 
principle, liberty, is experienced more
as loneliness than as freedom.”
In Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer 
argues that different principles of justice 
apply within different spheres of life. 
Serious problems of injustice and in­
equity arise when the differentiation of 
spheres starts to break down, and 
success in one sphere is necessary for 
success in all the others. In such a 
situation, one good becomes dominant, 
and the people who control it control 
everything. Pascal described such a 
situation as tyranny.
O
ur society is fast becoming 
tyrannical, with money (prop­
erty) as the dominant good. 
Money buys social position, housing, 
education, health care, good looks, 
and political power. When we see this 
in its extreme form, we recoil. Walzer 
describes the example of Pullman, 
Illinois, a company town literally owned 
—lock, stock, and barrel—by the Pull­
man Company. Mr. Pullman assumed 
that property rights applied in his 
town, just as they did in his factory. So 
just as he told its residents, all company 
employees, what to do in his factory, 
he also told them how to live in his 
town. They weren’t required to live 
there, and he was a reasonably benevo­
lent fellow, but, nevertheless, it seemed 
and was later judged in court to be 
wrong for anyone to “own.” a town. 
The town we all live in is becoming 
increasingly similar to Pullman.
V
How then do we go about preserving 
and protecting democracy from its 
corrosive contact with capitalism? Must 
we engage in the wholesale destruction 
of the state and the market as we know 
them? Bowles and Gintis think not. 
What is required is not one big struggle, 
but lots of small ones. Personal rights 
are to be preserved; they are not the 
mere bourgeois ideology perceived by 
Marxism. Property rights in some form 
are also to be preserved. For many 
years the mutual existence of personal 
and property rights seemed harmonious 
—even synergistic, as long as their 
discrete domains of application were 
preserved. But pressure to enlarge the 
sphere of personal rights has created 
conflicts. The way to resolve the con­
flicts, according to Bowles and Gintis, 
is to increase the scope of personal 
rights still further. If we increase the
range of permissible participation by 
workers in the workplace, by children 
in the school, by women and children 
in the family, we will foster the kind of 
human nature that will make for active 
participation in the state. Neither the 
corporation nor the state will be allowed 
to become autocratic.
There is nothing especially revolu­
tionary in this proposal. As Bowles and 
Gintis point out, it is in many ways busi­
ness as usual. Determining the scope 
of application of a set of principles is 
what social life is all about. The market 
is the place for exchanges of private 
property. But there are plenty of con­
straints on what can be exchanged, 
under what conditions. People can’t 
sell themselves into slavery, nor can 
they sell their children. Car salesmen 
can’t sell unsafe cars at a discount. 
Doctors and lawyers can’t give bad 
service at bargain prices. Workers can 
be fired from their jobs, but they can’t 
be beaten or imprisoned. What Bowles 
and Gintis are urging is that the differ­
ent spheres of social life as we know 
them be preserved, but that principles 
of democracy and participation nudge 
principles of hierarchy and ownership 
wherever possible.
How does this extension of principles 
of democracy work to preserve mediat­
ing institutions and broader participa­
tion? First, since people’s attitudes 
toward their work and their willingness 
to do it with care and energy depend 
on how work is organized, how rewards 
are distributed, and how authority is 
distributed, and how people are treated 
by their colleagues and supervisors, 
being treated as a responsible, partici­
pating agent on the job can be expected 
to contribute to the formation of char­
acter. Second, breaking down hierarchy, 
either in access to decisions or in 
access to goods, is a way of strengthen­
ing communal ties. As Walzer notes, 
“communal provision is important be­
cause it teaches us the value of mem­
bership. If we did not provide for one 
another, if we recognized no distinctions 
between members and strangers, we 
would have no reason to form and 
maintain political communities.”
In the short run, the recommenda­
tions of Bowles and Gintis can be 
effective. The extension of personal 
rights can invigorate mediating institu­
tions and strengthen democracy or at 
least protect it from being further 
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ism. But in the long run, the emphasis 
on personal rights feeds directly into 
the liberal individualism that Bowles 
and Gintis see as the philosophical 
core of our current social difficulties. 
In viewing the strategy of redressing 
the imbalance of rights as a general 
solution to the problem of conflict 
between democracy and capitalism, 
Bowles and Gintis are guilty of th? 
same kind of shortsightedness as Berger. 
If we imagine the sort of extension of 
personal rights they propose and look 
a few years into the future, what we 
will see is a collection of individuals, 
all guarding their personal rights as 
they deal with the market and the state. 
Mediating institutions will have van­
ished. They will have vanished because 
while they play a critical role in helping 
to protect personal rights, the pursuit 
of personal rights does nothing in itself 
to protect them. What is missing is a 
notion of obligation or responsibility 
to the group that counterbalances or 
restrains the pursuit of personal rights.
In the short term, while individuals are 
grateful to their local institutions for 
helping them win difficult battles for 
autonomy and respect, the individuals 
will stay loyal to the institutions. But 
in the long term, as autonomy becomes 
commonplace, the importance of the 
institutions will be forgotten. So as the 
dynamic process of securing personal 
rights proceeds, the solution will be­
come part of the problem.
Emphasis on individual rights has 
its times and places. It was critical in 
Western Europe and the colonies when 
people were trying to break the rigid 
social bonds of feudalism. But for us, 
those times are now past, and the appeal 
to individual rights must be balanced 
by an appeal to communal obligation 
and responsibility. Progressives have 
typically been suspicious of such ap­
peals, regarding them as veiled attempts 
to keep power in the hands of estab­
lished minority groups and out of the 
hands of the masses. And it should be 
said that such suspicions are not un­
warranted. However, what is most sorely 
needed now is an appeal to communal 
obligation that will keep mediating 
institutions strong enough to survive. 
Otherwise, isolated individuals will be 
pitted against states and markets that 
grow ever larger and less responsive to 
human concerns. The problem we all 
face is how to keep mediating institu­
tions strong without making them 
completely inflexible.
There is reason to believe—and to 
hope—that Americans who have always 
regarded themselves as progressive now 
understand how important it is to 
preserve the mediating institutions that 
have played a formative role in their 
own lives. People to whom tradition, 
and especially traditional institutions, 
were always anathema have come to 
see how empty it is to try and go it 
alone, and how difficult it is to create 
“instant institutions” whenever a need 
for organized action arises. □
Book Review
Jewish Education and the Chaiienge of Modernity
Barry W Holtz
Commandments and Concerns: Jewish 
Religious Education in Secular Society 
by Michael Rosenak. Jewish Publication 
Society, 1987, 309 pp.
J
ewish education suffers from many 
ills—inadequate funding, untrained 
personnel, spiritual ennui, to name 
the most obvious—but it is rare 
that we consider a profound difficulty 
that underlies all the rest: Jewish edu­
cation is a field devoid of almost any 
serious theoretical or philosophical
Rarry W Holtz is codirector of the 
Melton Research Center for Jewish 
Education at the Jewish Theological 
Seminary of America and teaches in the 
Seminary’s Department of Jewish Educa­
tion. He is the editor o/Back to the 
Sources: Reading the Classic Jewish 
Texts (Summit Books, 1984) and co­
author o/Your Word Is Fire: The 
Hasidic Masters on Contemplative 
Prayer (Schocken, 1987).
reflection about the basic issues of the 
enterprise. It has produced almost no 
writing or thinking about the basic 
issues. One can find virtually no jour­
nals of stature devoted to such discus­
sions; one can count on one’s fingers 
the number of university scholars in 
this country whose sole responsibility 
is the academic discipline of Jewish 
education. And one finds a rather small 
library, indeed, of full-length books 
devoted to the subject.
Thus, to say that Michael Rosenak’s 
Commandments and Concerns is the 
finest book about Jewish education of 
at least the last decade (as it certainly 
is), or that it indeed may be the finest 
book ever published in the English 
language about the theory and philos­
ophy of Jewish education in the modern 
age, is both to recognize the magnificent 
contribution of this work and to ac­
knowledge the state of the field as it 
stands today.
I do not mean to give a backhanded 
compliment to Rosenak for his ac­
complishment. This book would be a 
major work no matter what the library 
of Jewish education looked like. The 
questiqp the book addresses is monu­
mental: How has modernity changed 
the nature of the way we must pass on 
the Jewish tradition to future genera­
tions? Rosenak shows quite convinc­
ingly that for all but the most insulated 
Orthodox communities there is no 
escaping the effects of modernity on 
the task of education. The various 
coping strategies by which some people 
retreat into the fantasy of an intact 
premodern world (even though it no 
longer exists) and others bend tradition 
to the whim of a false “relevance” all 
fail to address the central problem at 
the core—we live in the world of 
modernity and that fact lies at the 
heart of our educational dilemma.
Rosenak believes that exploring this
72 Tikkun, Vol. 3, No. 1
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